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market returns, stock characteristics, and a variety of performance indicators, we find analysts are more 
likely to issue favorable reports when the stock is held by affiliated mutual funds.  The more invested by 
affiliated mutual funds, the more optimistic the analyst rating compared to the consensus. 
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Universal banks provide many services, including securities trading, sell-side research, 
investment banking, and asset management.  Despite regulation requiring independence between these 
departments, there is evidence that this is not always the case.  Prior literature on the relationships 
between investment bank and affiliated sell-side analysts documents that banks use research as a 
marketing tool to support their underwriting business.  Initial recommendations of up to “strong buy” on 
an underwriter’s stock-clients turn out to describe modest long-run stock performance (Michaely and 
Womack (1999)).  In the market boom of 1999-2000, some growing evidence of conflicts of interest led 
authorities to strengthen regulations with regard to analyst independence from investment banking 
departments. 
If sell-side analysts are restricted from influencing investment banking, is their research then any 
more independent?  Nelson’s Directory of Investment Managers reports that, in 2003, Merrill Lynch 
Investment Managers used Wall Street sell-side analysts 40% of the time to make portfolio decisions for 
$500 billion of managed assets.  Morgan Stanley Investment Management Inc. used street research for 
20% of its total information resources in 2003; Goldman Sachs Asset Management for 10%; Citibank 
Asset Management for 30%; and Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC for 40%.  Research like this is 
usually paid for by receiving “soft dollars” into the trading department of sell-side analysts.  It is intended 
to supplement buy-side analysis and benefit decision-making.  However, since the in-house money 
manager is typically one of the brokerage firm’s best clients, sell-side analysts may have incentives not 
only to provide proprietary research but also to publicly promote stocks the managers hold.   
While analyst careers depend on forecasting accuracy (Stickel (1992)), full-service brokerage 
houses also reward analysts who tout stocks.  Hong and Kubik (2003) report that, in the late 1990s, 
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Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2005) find that the more institutional investors hold a firm’s 
equity, the more accurate its earnings forecasts.  From 1994 to 2000, analyst recommendations on stocks 
highly visible to institutional investors were less likely to be influenced by investment banking or 
brokerage house pressures.  Yet, it may be rewarding for analysts to look favorably on less visible stocks 
the affiliated mutual funds hold. 
Extending the analysis to include in-house relations between asset management and brokerage 
research departments implies moving the focus from the initiation of coverage on unseasoned stocks to its 
continuation on seasoned stocks.  The new focus reveals that securities analysts are subject to many 
different sources of pressure and from different directions.  Analysis of the nature of these pressures 
would help regulators develop a more effective definition of independence criteria for sell-side analysts. 
Do intra-organizational affiliations affect analyst research on seasoned firms?  The evidence we 
collected by analyzing 16,824 connections between research departments and established listed 
companies says yes, in several respects.  First, from 1995 through 2003, both affiliations with investment 
banks and mutual funds affect decisions on continuing research on seasoned stocks.  Consider that when 
an issuing company replaces its original underwriters, affiliated analysts are much less likely to continue 
coverage.  Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) suggest that firms switch lead underwriters mainly to 
benefit from more reputable analyst coverage.  Losing research from the former analysts clearly 
represents one negative side-effect of switching.  Also, we find analyst teams are likely to research a 
stock when the affiliated mutual funds already hold it in their portfolios. 
Second, from 1995 through 2001, analysts are significantly more optimistic about seasoned 
stocks, when they are affiliated with mutual funds.  In particular, between 1999 and 2001, firms with 
below-the-median growth prospects or below-the-median accounting ratios receive favorable ratings, and 
ratings that are even better than the consensus.  Analysts on the Institutional Investor All-American 
Research Team report the most optimism in covering stocks held by affiliated mutual funds.  In the last 
years of our sample period, from 2002 to 2003, ratings become pessimistic.  Overall, when mutual funds 
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reports than unaffiliated analysts.  Robustness tests confirm the causal link between affiliation with 
mutual funds and analyst optimism.  On the contrary, analysts affiliated with investment banks assign 
ratings to seasoned firms as favorable as unaffiliated analysts.  Similarly to James and Karceski (2005), 
any bias surrounding the offer of new underwritten securities fades over time.   
Third, controlling for several factors including the institutional presence in a stock, our results 
show the more invested by affiliated mutual funds, the greater the analyst optimism.  For instance, when a 
mutual fund increases the amount invested in a stock from the first quartile ($1.50 million) to the median 
($7.29 million at the end of 2003) of the holding distribution, the probability that an affiliated analyst 
issues a recommendation more favorable than the consensus increases by 13%.  Analyst career concerns 
generally combine with brokerage firm reputation to favor accuracy over optimism in the case of stocks 
highly visible to institutional investors (Ljungqvist et al. (2005)).  This is not necessarily so when the 
affiliated funds invest significantly in less visible stocks.  Promoting stocks with a rating of strong buy 
that surprises the consensus produces a median three-day abnormal return of 1.03% around the report day 
(a mean return of 1.70%). 
To sum this up, the so-called Chinese walls between departments of a universal bank do not 
appear to be working perfectly.  Sell-side analysts promote the seasoned stocks that affiliated mutual 
funds already hold.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section I, we discuss the contribution of 
this paper with respect to related literature.  Section II describes sampling procedures and reports the 
frequency of analyst coverage for our sample of seasoned stocks over a nine-year period from 1995 to 
2003.  In Section III, we present the univariate analysis of both affiliations with investment banks and 
mutual funds as possible explanations of analysts’ decisions to continue favorable stock coverage.   
Section IV formally tests our hypothesis using multivariate survival analysis as well as a number of 
econometric methodologies to confirm the robustness of our results.  Finally, in Section V, we draw a 
summary of our findings and their implications for future research. 
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I. Related Literature 
Research has generally focused on the relations between investment banking and sell-side 
analysts working for an affiliated brokerage house.  Analyst coverage is clearly an important service that 
investment bankers provide for a new equity issue, along with pricing and distribution (Dunbar (2000)).  
At the time of both going public and offering new shares, issuing companies want favorable and 
influential coverage.  Investment banks are in a good position to provide this additional service. 
Analysis of ratings shows that analysts affiliated with lead underwriters are favorably biased in 
their first recommendation on initial public offering (IPO) firms.  Michaely and Womack (1999) 
document that in the month after the quiet period lead underwriter analysts release 50% more buy 
recommendations on the IPO than analysts from other brokerage firms.  Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 
(2003) focus on the initiation of analyst coverage after the 25-day period following an IPO.  Analysts 
affiliated with investment banks first initiate the coverage, and during 1996 to 2000 almost always with a 
favorable rating.  Covered firms experience a five-day abnormal return of 4.1% versus 0.1% for firms 
without any coverage.  The more analysts initiate coverage, the higher the reported abnormal return.  
Rajan and Servaes (1997) and Cliff and Denis (2004) find the amount of analyst coverage following an 
IPO positively related to underpricing. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) suggest investors expect affiliated analysts to look favorably on 
issuing firms.  In fact, the market responds differently to the announcement of buy recommendations by 
lead underwriter analysts and unaffiliated analysts.  Average IPO size-adjusted excess returns at the event 
date are 2.7% for underwriter analyst recommendations, compared to 4.4% for unaffiliated analyst 
recommendations.  In the long run, however, firms recommended by their underwriter analysts perform 
significantly more poorly than firms recommended by other analysts.  In the seasoned equity offering 
(SEO) market, Lin and McNichols (1998) report significantly more negative three-day returns upon the 
announcement of lead underwriter analyst hold recommendations than on the announcement of 
unaffiliated analyst hold recommendations.  This suggests investors expect lead analysts are more likely 
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Ritter (2005) find no evidence that market participants discount recommendations from affiliated 
analysts.  The information advantage of affiliated analysts outweighs any conflicts of interest. 
James and Karceski (2005) find that IPOs with poor aftermarket performance have been given 
higher target prices and were more likely to receive strong buy recommendations, especially from 
analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter.  They suggest affiliated analysts provide protection for newly 
listed companies in the form of “booster shots” of strong coverage.  The coverage has a positive effect on 
the firm’s stock price in the first 30 days after the offer date; the average three-day abnormal return is 
between 3.4% and 4.4%.  The “immunization” seems good for only the first two analyst reports, and lasts 
typically less than six months.   
Relative to the existing literature, our analysis reveals more about the long-term pressures on 
analysts within a typical universal bank.  We extend the time frame of analysis of the relations between 
investment banking and sell-side affiliated analysts beyond the initiation of coverage.  That is, we test 
whether affiliation affects the choice of continuing to cover and positively rate firms that are clients of the 
investment bank. 
Furthermore, our analysis extends the literature in including another typical affiliation within 
universal banks, the connection between asset management and sell-side analysts, which few authors have 
analyzed.  Irvine, Nathan, and Simko (2004) find that affiliation with mutual funds improves analyst 
accuracy thanks to the information advantage.  Ritter and Zhang (2005) document the relations between 
investment banks and affiliated funds during IPOs.  In the Internet bubble period of 1999-2000, there is 
some evidence that the lead underwriter allocates hot IPOs to its affiliated funds to boost fund 
performance and attract more money inflows.  Investment banks use IPO allocations for the same reasons 
they use the affiliated favorable research.  Johnson and Marietta-Westberg (2005) show, in fact, that IPO 
underwriters use their institutional funds to help earn more underwriting business. 
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Our data include all analysts who covered stocks with research reports during 1994, a year 
characterized by no particularly sensitive financial issues or turbulence.  The IBES database identifies the 
name of the analyst covering a given stock, the brokerage house the analyst works for, and the report date.  
Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2005) document that business relationships at the brokerage firm level 
affect the analyst’s decision to cover a stock.  To analyze the persistence of the research coverage, our 
study focuses on the relations between the research departments of brokerage houses (hereafter called 
analyst teams) and stock-issuing firms.
1
During 1994, 154 analyst teams covered between 1 and 976 stocks.  The average team covered 
about 109 stocks.  Our sampling procedure lets us identify 16,824 observations as distinct relations 
between analyst team i and stock j (i = 1, 2, …, 154, and j = 1, 2, …,  4,121).  For example, in 1994 
Goldman Sachs issued research reports on 729 stocks, while Bear Stearns covered 478 stocks.  Although 
some companies such as Intel Corp. are covered by both brokerage houses, the two relationships, 
Goldman Sachs-Intel and Bear Stearns-Intel, are distinct, and generate two separate observations in our 
data set. 
Table I reports the main descriptive statistics for the sample of stocks.  29% of the covered stocks 
are in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index.  Only 6% are traded over-the-counter or on regional exchanges.  
Stocks tend to be listed in the main U.S. markets, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the Nasdaq, or 
the American Stock Exchange (Amex).  NYSE-listed companies are the most represented (59%).  The 
sample includes utility stocks and tech stocks roughly in the same proportions (7%).  Utility companies 
are identified as in the two-digit SIC industry of 49; tech companies are defined as in the four-digit SIC 
codes reported in Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
There are two types of affiliation in the relations between analyst team i and stock j.  The first 
type is a common definition in the literature on analyst coverage.  The second definition is less 
conventional. 
                                                 
1 The fact that listed companies report their analyst coverage by the brokerage firm name, not often by individual 
analysts, also supports our approach at analyst team-level.  
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and stock-issuing firm j are affiliated with investment banking if firm j’s securities were once 
underwritten by the analyst team’s investment bank.  In other words, there is an affiliation when the in-
house investment bank was a member of the managing syndicate in the most recent SEO, debt issue or at 
the time of the IPO.  Unaffiliated analyst teams, including teams associated with other syndicate 
members, become a control group, as the research shows that only managing underwriters play a 
significant role in the offering process and in analyst coverage.  A business relationship between the 
issuer and other members of the syndicate is weaker or even not present (Michaely and Womack (1999); 
Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000); Corwin and Schultz (2005)).  Data on underwriting affiliations come 
from the SDC database. 
In our second less conventional connotation, analyst team i and stock j are affiliated with asset 
management when at least one of the affiliated mutual funds already holds stock j in its portfolio.  For 
example, Prudential Financial manages several mutual funds.  CDA/Spectrum Institutional Money 
Manager (13f) Holdings database aggregates the ownership data from individual mutual funds to a money 
manager-level on a quarterly basis.  As a money manager, Prudential invests in Intel and reports its 
holdings at the end of the fourth quarter 1994.  In this case, we regard the Prudential analyst team 
covering Intel as affiliated, starting from first quarter 1995 until the quarter Intel disappears from 
Prudential’s portfolio.  The following chart demonstrates the in-house relationships generating the two 
types of affiliations. 
Investment Bank  Mutual Funds 
Analyst Team of 
Brokerage House 
Listed Stock 
Type I - Affiliation  
with Investment Bank 
Type II - Affiliation 
with Asset Management
underwrites  hold 
covers 
 
At the end of 1994, about 21% of firms in our sample received coverage from the analyst team 
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of the firms are in the portfolios of mutual funds affiliated with the brokerage firm analyst team.  Just 6% 
of sample stocks are affiliated with both investment bank and mutual funds. 
We use the quarterly coverage rate as a measure of research production.  Analysts are not obliged 
to report on a regular basis.  Our conversations with some analysts suggest that release of at least two 
reports a year may be expected.  Empirically, the time between reports is random enough to suggest that 
reports are released as new information changes an analyst’s valuation.   
Listed companies are required to disclose financial statements on a quarterly basis.  Every 
quarter, analyst team i decides to issue a report on stock j or not.  In quarter t, the observed occurrence of 
report-issuing on stock j reveals the analyst team’s choice of continuing coverage or breaking the silence 
on a particular stock, relative to the previous quarter.  The quarterly coverage rate is defined as the 
number of reports issued divided by the total number of possible coverage events. 
In the last quarter of 1994, analyst teams released reports on less than a third of the stocks.  The 
coverage rate was 27.87% (4,689 of 16,824 potential reports).  The quarterly coverage rate thus defined is 
the initial productivity rate of the analyst teams in our sample. 
 
III. Univariate Analysis 
The last quarter of 1994 is taken as the baseline quarter 0.  We confine analysis to the set of 
16,824 relationships between analyst teams and stocks over 36 consecutive quarters from the first quarter 
of 1995 through the fourth quarter of 2003.  Because we investigate the persistence of research on 
seasoned stocks, no other analyst teams and/or covered stocks are further added to our sample.  As a 
result, the number of relationships is naturally subject to right-censoring due to concentration in the 
brokerage industry and/or stock delisting. 
Corwin and Schultz (2005) and Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) document that mergers 
and acquisitions in the late 1990s significantly reduced numbers in the brokerage industry.  We treat 
analyst teams incorporated into an acquirer as inactive from the time of the acquisition.  Our reasoning is 
that clienteles and analyst specialties may change following a merger.  An example is that we eliminate 
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Suisse First Boston, although individual analysts might have kept working for the acquirer.  As of the end 
of 2003, 86 analyst teams were active of the initial 154.  Similarly, we eliminate stock-issuing firms that 
were delisted once they merged with other listed companies.  As of the end of 2003, there were 1,941 
stocks remaining of the initial 4,121.  Over the nine-year period, the combined censoring effects result in 
5,920 of 16,824 relationships still active as of the end of the 36
th quarter. 
Figure 1 plots evolution of the coverage rate for the period.  Controlling for censoring in the 
number of relations between analyst teams and covered stocks, the quarterly coverage rate declines from 
about 20% to 10% over the first four years.  Over 1999-2001, the production of reports on active stocks 
by active teams remains consistently below 10%.  This low production may be explained by the 
uncertainty characterizing the 1999-2000 alleged market bubble and its subsequent burst in 2001.  2002 
brings a renewal in research productivity.  In the third quarter of 2002, the coverage rate jumps to 
approximately 23%, exceeding even the productivity rate recorded at the beginning of 1995.  The major 
increase in September 2002 appears to be temporary.  In 2002-2003 the coverage rate again averages 
around 14%, to drop to 10% in the last quarter of 2003. 
How do we explain the spike in the number of reports released in third quarter 2002?  After they 
recovered from the lows reached in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, all major stock 
indices slid steadily starting in March 2002.  The dollar declined against the euro, reaching a one-to-one 
valuation not seen since the introduction of the European currency.  Over the first half of 2002, the S&P 
500 fell by 14.6% for a variety of reasons: the burst of bubble conditions, a new (official NBER) 
recession, and uncertainty attributed to the war in Afghanistan.  In the third quarter of 2002, the stock 
market recorded a further drop of 16.6%.  The Dow Jones Industrial Average tumbled to a four-year 
record low on September 24, 2002, while Nasdaq prices plummeted to a six-year low.  
The first changes in analyst regulations were enacted during summer 2002 when the bear market 
triggered concerns that investors might have been misled by biased analyst research.  In July 2002, 
following the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the NASD and NYSE set new rules (Rule NASD 
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requiring analysts to disclose any financial interest in securities recommended, and barring analysts from 
personal trading.  Analysts since then have been required to disclose the distribution of the ratings 
assigned to a given stock in the prior 12 months, along with the percentage of buy, hold, and sell 
recommendations assigned to all covered stocks.  On August 2, 2002, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) proposed the Analyst Certification Rule, finally released in April 2003.  It requires 
that any research report disseminated include both a certification that assessments expressed accurately 
reflect the analyst’s personal views and a report of any compensation received.  
Changing market conditions and changing regulation may have prompted analysts to write more 
reports to try to alter previous views.  Analysis of the ratings provides some insights as to this hypothesis.  
On a five-point scale − where 1 is the best rating (strong buy) and 5 the worst (sell) − the ratings assigned 
by analysts in our sample during third quarter 2002 are, on average, significantly worse than the ones in 
the preceding second quarter (2.60 compared to 2.27). 
A. Factors Affecting the Continuation of Research Coverage  
In our sample, the average stock receives three reports over a nine-year period.  Some stocks 
receive quite constant coverage over time.  For example, HSBC James Capel released reports on Louis 
Vuitton Moet Hennessy in 22 of the 36 quarters between 1995 and 2003.  Other stocks see no coverage 
for long periods, but then re-gain analysts’ attention (e.g., after seven years of silence, in November 2002 
Bear Stearns issued a report on May Department Stores).  Another group of companies consistently 
receives no coverage for years in a row so, at least ex post, we can see termination of coverage.
2
We hypothesize that four main factors explain the persistent production of research reports in the 
long run: market conditions, stock characteristics, firm performance, and analyst team characteristics. 
1.  To represent market conditions, we summarize all the macroeconomic factors affecting 
volume, returns, and volatility in equity markets. 
                                                 
2 Since 2002, NYSE/Nasdaq rules have required analysts to note coverage termination in their final report. Before 
these amendments, notifications of dropping coverage were extremely rare.  
  112.  Stock characteristics related to firm size, listing exchange, and industry may affect the 
probability of receiving research coverage.  For example, large established companies included in 
benchmark industry indices are likely to be regularly assessed by analysts.  
3.  The economic performance of companies is a likely determinant of coverage decisions.  The 
better the firm’s growth prospects, the higher the probability it will attract lasting analyst coverage. 
4.  Analyst team characteristics include size and affiliation.  The size of analyst teams may affect 
continuing release of reports.  At the end of 1994, the median team was composed of 38 analysts; 
interestingly, median team size more than doubles over our nine-year sample period (although this 
increase may be survival-biased).  As research departments are seen as increasingly important in an 
organization, more analysts are expected to provide research coverage. 
Analyst team affiliation with other banking departments is not supposed to affect decisions on 
continuing coverage.  Even before revised analyst regulation to enforce the separation between 
investment banks and their research departments, professional codes of conduct prescribed independence 
in analyst behavior.  According to the independence principle, affiliation with an investment bank is one 
characteristic of the analyst team that should determine neither initiation of coverage nor its termination.  
Nor does the independence principle imply that affiliation with mutual funds should affect research 
productivity.  
Table II assesses the relationship between coverage rates and major characteristics of stocks and 
analyst teams.  The characteristics and coverage rates are updated quarterly.  That is, the affiliation 
between analyst teams and investment banks is updated by checking the managing syndicates of the 931 
SEOs and 28,280 convertible and non-convertible debt issues of the sample during the nine-year period.  
Similarly, the affiliation with mutual funds is updated by analyzing the composition of portfolios quarter-
by-quarter.  The quarterly update of 13f institutional holdings advises us to lag the affiliation by one 
quarter.  When the institutional investor reports the holding of stock j at the end of quarter t-1, the in-
house research team is considered affiliated starting from quarter t.  Data concerning this type of 
affiliation as well as portfolio composition come from multiple sources, CRSP/Compustat Merged, SDC, 
  12and the 13f Institutional Holdings databases. 
In the nine-year period, the average coverage rate of 11.93% for all active observations is taken as 
a reference point.  Not surprisingly, stocks in the S&P 500 index obtain research coverage at an above-
average rate; the same is true but to a lesser extent for stocks traded on the NYSE.  Amex-listed stocks are 
covered even less than stocks traded over-the-counter or on regional exchanges.  The average utility stock 
also receives less attention than tech stocks.  Finally, analyst team affiliation matters.  Despite what the 
analyst independence principle would suggest, stocks underwritten by affiliated investment banks receive 
above-average coverage (13.97%).  Portfolio investments by mutual funds also affect affiliated analyst 
teams’ selection of stocks covered (13.91%).  Stocks benefiting from both in-house affiliations receive the 
highest degree of coverage of all (16.26%). 
Over three subperiods, 1995-1998, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003, all stocks experienced a decline in 
coverage in the middle period.  Interestingly, since 2002, utility stocks have received more coverage than 
tech stocks, although a higher coverage rate does not necessarily imply optimism in ratings.  In fact, this 
phenomenon took place in the aftermath of the Enron scandal as major debt issues were issued to finance 
projects in the newly deregulated energy markets. 
To analyze the relationship between analyst coverage and firm performance, we use market-book 
value ratio, earnings per share, and asset turnover to measure, respectively, firm growth prospects, 
profitability, and efficiency.  The market-book value (MBV) ratio is defined as the sum of the market 
value of equity and the book value of long-term debt and preferred stock, divided by the book value of 
total assets.  Asset turnover is quarterly sales divided by total assets.  We also look at one of the most 
typical instruments of technical analysis, a moving average-based relative index, which should provide a 
measure of price momentum.  All variables are time-varying and updated on a quarterly basis. 
Figure 2 plots the median economic and financial performance in quarter t-1 of firms receiving 
reports in each quarter t from 1995 through 2003.  Uncovered stocks represent the control group. 
Analyst teams generally pick winner stocks for quarterly reports.  As Panels A and B show, the 
stocks analyzed in analyst reports are those with higher median MBV ratios or significantly higher 
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reports, but efficiency in the use of assets to generate revenues seems not a decisive factor.  As reported in 
Panel C, stocks receiving coverage have insignificantly higher median asset turnover than the control 
firms until 1998, when a reversal in the rankings occurs.  By the end of the sample period, uncovered 
stocks report a significantly higher asset turnover than those covered.  This evidence is consistent with 
less optimistic analyst research in 2002. 
Finally, the choice of stocks reported on is also related to technical analysis considerations.  Panel 
D shows that the closing prices of stocks covered during quarter t frequently exceed the 200-day moving 
average in the period.  We use the 200-day moving average for three reasons.  First, a long period 
smoothes price trends and makes results less sensitive to short-term volatility.  Second, in a bull market, 
stock prices tend by construction to hover above their shorter moving averages when the last closing price 
exceeds the 200-day moving average.  This controls for times the 200-day moving average is exceeded 
around the end of the quarter.  Third, “technicians” believe that under 20% of listed stocks above their 
200-day moving average predicts a sharp bullish reversal in the market.  In August 2002 and January 
2003, NYSE-listed stocks dropped below this threshold. 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests reported in Table III systematically confirm the 
significance of the differences in median performance between stocks receiving coverage and stocks not 
in each quarter.  The table includes three additional one-quarter lagged performance indicators: return on 
equity (ROE), dividend yield, and leverage ratio.  ROE is calculated as quarterly earnings divided by the 
book value of equity.  The dividend yield is defined as quarterly dividends per share divided by the 
closing price at the end of each quarter.  The leverage ratio is long-term debt divided by the book value of 
equity.  Subsample results indicate stocks receiving quarterly coverage perform significantly better by all 
indicators except for asset turnover and leverage ratios.  We have noted that in the 2002-2003 period, the 
asset turnover ratio experiences a reversal, and the leverage ratio is significantly higher for firms receiving 
coverage.  In other words, less efficient and more indebted firms receive preferential coverage, at least in 
the latter part of the sample period.  Moreover, all median indicators report a decline over time, except for 
  14the dividend yield. 
B.  Continuing Favorable Coverage 
So far the univariate analysis does not account for the ratings assigned by analyst teams.  Figure 3 
displays the distribution of ratings on the five-point scale (1=strong buy; 5=sell).  Bradley, Jordan, and 
Ritter (2003) note that analyst rating schemes are not standardized, but can vary from one firm to another, 
so we use the standard IBES recommendations.  Analyst recommendations are mapped to one of the five 
standard values.  If analyst team i releases multiple reports on a given stock j in quarter t, we use the first 
rating. 
Figure 3 categorizes rating distributions by analyst team affiliations and subperiods.  Like other 
researchers, we find analyst teams affiliated with investment banks that had provided issuing companies 
with underwriting services tend to be favorable on issuer stocks.  After the Internet bubble burst, the 
favorable disposition weakens.  In Panel A, the distribution is highly right-skewed.  In the first two 
subperiods, the buy recommendation is both the mode and the median point.  Strong buys and buys 
combined represent about 66% in the first subperiod, 68% during 1999 to 2001, and 45% in the last two 
years.  In this later period, although the percentage of holds and underperforms increases considerably, 
there is no significant increase in the proportion of sells.  Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2005) find 
that, after adoption of the new analyst regulations, the likelihood of receiving an optimistic 
recommendation no longer depends on whether the brokerage house had underwritten an equity offering.   
Yet analysts, especially affiliated analysts, remain reluctant to release pessimistic recommendations.   
Panel B reports rating distributions for analyst teams unaffiliated with investment banks. 
The distribution of ratings assigned by analyst teams affiliated with mutual funds in Panel C of 
Figure 3 looks identical to the distribution in Panel A.  Also, in Panel D rating distributions for analysts 
unaffiliated with mutual funds look similar to the ones in Panel B.  This similarity cannot be explained by 
overlaps between the two groups of affiliated analyst teams; only 6% of stocks are affiliated both with 
investment banks and mutual funds as of the end of 1994, and this proportion declines over time.   
To examine analyst ratings, we control for accounting performance of the covered firms.  Each 
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quarter t.  The quarterly consensus is obtained from IBES as a partially exogenous variable, considering 
all the ratings assigned in the analyst industry, including initiating and already-covering analysts.  As 
McNichols and O’Brien (1997) suggest, an initial bias in the selection of stocks explains the optimism in 
the first rating as research coverage is initiated by analysts.  Other authors also document that the 
selection bias is particularly strong when analysts are affiliated with investment banks.  Because our 
sample includes only already-covering analyst teams, the IBES consensus results are on average more 
favorable than our sample rating, 2.19 compared to 2.27. 
Scaling all ratings by consensus facilitates comparison of ratings for stocks covered by different 
groups of analyst teams.  We distinguish between relative and absolute favorable recommendations; that 
is, affiliated analyst teams may be relatively more favorable than unaffiliated.  We measure the relative 
optimism or favorability categorized by affiliation by a t-test of the difference between mean ratings.  
Affiliated analysts may not only issue more favorable reports than unaffiliated analysts, but also more 
favorable reports than the rest of the industry.  On a five-point scale where five is the worst rating, a 
lower-than-one value of the rating divided by the consensus means that analysts are absolutely favorable 
on stock j.  A value equal to one indicates that the analyst team confirms the general consensus with its 
recommendation. 
Table IV reports the average rating divided by the consensus over the three subperiods.  Ratings 
are categorized by performance indicators.  The market-book value ratio, earnings per share, asset 
turnover, return on equity, dividend yield, and leverage ratio are one-quarter lagged.  A performance 
indicator is regarded as high when it exceeds the median quarterly value.  Panel A describes analysts 
affiliated with investment banks.  Their recommendations are relatively more favorable than unaffiliated 
analyst recommendations, especially between 1995 and 1998.  For instance, highly leveraged firms or 
those with below-the-median dividend yield receive a significantly higher average rating from affiliated 
analyst teams than from others, although a less favorable rating than the general consensus.  In the middle 
period, the difference in behavior by affiliation with investment bank generates weaker p-values.  Finally, 
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James and Karceski (2005) report that affiliated individual analysts modify their overly positive 
recommendations starting from the third report following the public offering.  We also find that analyst 
teams affiliated with investment banks are not strongly biased in continuing research on seasoned 
equities.  In any case, if there ever were a bias in their recommendations, it definitely disappears in the 
last period when new regulations on conflicts of interest between research and investment banking were 
established and the top-ten investment firms agreed to settle enforcement actions in April 2003. 
Panel B of Table IV reports average ratings by affiliation with mutual funds.  Controlling for firm 
performance, an affiliation with a mutual fund significantly affects average analyst team ratings.  Over 
1995-1998, stocks in affiliated mutual fund portfolios significantly and unconditionally receive better 
recommendations.  In other words, analyst teams following seasoned stocks that are held by the affiliated 
mutual funds are relatively more favorable (if still worse than the consensus).  In the 1999-2001 
subperiod, the affiliated analysts results are significantly favorable toward companies reporting less-than-
brilliant accounting performance.  Firms with below-the-median market-book value, earnings per share, 
asset turnover, return on equity or firms that were highly leveraged are assigned better ratings, even more 
favorable than the overall consensus.  Over the 2002-2003 period, the disposition of teams affiliated with 
mutual funds becomes less favorable, although the difference fails to be statistically significant. 
What would motivate analyst teams to issue favorable ratings on stocks held by affiliated 
institutional investors?  We argue that team-level incentives may exacerbate individual-level motivations.  
First, an individual analyst working for a sell-side team may want to please the affiliated mutual funds.  It 
has been suggested that analysts are particularly interested in the annual ranking published by 
Institutional Investor (I.I.) in October each year.  Since 1972, I.I. has conducted an annual survey of 
major money management institutions to identify analysts who have performed the best in their research 
sectors during the previous year.  The top-four analysts are termed All-American Research stars, or 
simply, all-stars.  Recognition of this sort seems to have economic consequences.  According to Fortune 
and the Wall Street Journal, standing in the annual I.I. poll is a major factor in determining analyst 
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3  Although no compensation scheme is officially available to confirm this hypothesis, 
researchers have documented that all-stars experience the highest turnover in the industry (Clarke, 
Dunbar, and Kahle (2003)).  Bonuses from their employers or salary raises offered by a new employer 
may represent a strong incentive to look favorably on stocks already held by mutual funds, especially for 
affiliated analysts.  Tipping institutional investors prior to the release of analyst buy and strong buy 
recommendations may be another related practice (Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2004)). 
Second, brokerage firms may have a complementary interest in encouraging optimism at an 
individual analyst-level.  Analyst team reputation depends on the number of employed analysts selected 
as I.I. stars.  Dunbar (2000) finds that a bank whose research team is named an I.I. leader experiences an 
increase in underwriting market share.  An increase in trading business with affiliated mutual funds may 
be another positive externality for brokerage firms.  This hypothesis is not testable, as we are not aware of 
any database identifying payers and recipients of commission fees, even on an aggregate basis (Irvine 
(2001)).   
Table V tests whether all star-analysts issue favorable reports on stocks held by affiliated 
institutional investors.  In this case, the sample covers only continuing reports by all-stars, about 20% of 
the initial sample.  Throughout the nine-year period, all-star analysts report significantly favorably on 
firms in which affiliated mutual funds are investing.  In the first subperiod between 1995 and 1998, the 
average rating divided by the consensus is 1.03 (compared to 1.06 when all-stars are covering unaffiliated 
stocks).  The relative optimism is directed mostly to firms with above-the-median performance, but all 
ratings assigned to affiliated stocks by all-stars are, on average, worse than the consensus.  In 1999-2001, 
all-star analysts are absolutely more favorable than the consensus on stocks held by affiliated institutional 
investors, whatever the performance indicators.  Both good and poor performers are absolutely favored.  
                                                 
3 “Today analysts are hired not only to research companies and to select stocks. They are also expected to get out 
there and sell their research to big institutional clients, which then demand a great deal of their time and attention” 
(Fortune, October 1, 1990, p. 195). The Wall Street Journal (October 29, 1991, p. C1) reports the words of one 
research director: “Most of the guys know that they’ll be visiting for the I.I. in the spring,” that is, making annual 
pilgrimages to see clients and implicitly lobbying for I.I. votes. “I’m a lonely guy in March and April,” shortly 
before the balloting, he says, because all his analysts are out on the road. 
 
  18In the last period, the favorable disposition is once more only relative, and differences are generally not 
statistically significant.  Finally, a comparison of Table V and Panel B of Table IV indicates all-star 
analysts are the group that gives the most positive ratings during 1999-2001, when they cover stocks held 
by affiliated mutual funds (i.e., 0.97 compared to an overall mean of 1.00).  
If enhancing trading business with affiliated mutual funds drives the favorable disposition of 
analyst teams, we would expect that the more invested in a given stock, the more inflated the rating.  
Table VI tests this hypothesis.  Investment is the invested dollar amount, i.e., the number of shares held 
by the affiliated institutional investor multiplied by the stock price as of the end of the quarter.  All types 
of shares, both voting and non-voting, are considered to determine quarterly holdings.  Also, the amount 
invested in a firm’s equity is lagged by one quarter so that we can see whether investment size affects the 
ratings subsequently assigned by affiliated analyst teams, and not vice versa.  At the end of 1994 affiliated 
institutional investors had invested $1.85 million in the median stock.  The median amount invested 
roughly quadruples over the sample period to $7.29 million by the end of 2003. 
Panel A of Table VI reports average subperiod rating (divided by the consensus) assigned by 
analyst teams affiliated with mutual funds as amount invested increases.  From the first third (small 
investment tercile) to the highest third (large investment tercile), stocks generally receive higher average 
ratings with different levels of significance in the t-test of differences between means.  Over 1999-2001, 
analyst teams assign ratings higher than the consensus to stocks largely held by affiliated investors.  The 
relationship between holding size and positive ratings is generally monotonic, although the t-tests for 
differences in means between the highest and the lowest third are not statistically significant, except for 
the last subperiod.  Panel B of Table VI focuses on all-star analysts.  They seem less favorably disposed 
toward stocks held in smaller amounts by the affiliated mutual funds, and more favorably toward stocks 
held in larger amounts.  The statistical significance of the t-tests increases, and the null hypothesis of no 
difference can now be rejected with a p-value between zero and 5%.  This represents some evidence that 
all-star analysts may consistently issue optimistic recommendations on stocks that figure prominently in 
the portfolios of affiliated mutual funds. 
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While affiliations with both investment banks and institutional investors affect analyst team 
decisions to continue covering a stock, the second type of affiliation appears to be considerably more 
relevant.  When analyst teams (and especially all-star analysts) report on stocks held by affiliated mutual 
funds, their average ratings are more favorable.  During the bubble and then its subsequent burst, the 
ratings assigned to these stocks are even better than the general consensus. 
Is this favorable disposition influential?  In other words, is there any impact on stock price around 
the day reports are released by affiliated research teams?  Table VII answers these questions.  We use 
Eventus® for Cross-Sectional Analysis to determine the three-day abnormal returns for each stock that 
receives coverage.  Day 0 marks the report date.  Market-adjusted returns are determined using the CRSP 
equally weighted NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq index.  To control for dependence of returns, we choose a 255-
trading day estimation period starting 46 days before the event date.  We categorize the median three-day 
abnormal returns as an effect of the rating assigned.  As we saw in Figure 3, underperform and sell ratings 
represent such low percentages that it would not be informative to report them separately. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) suggest that investors expect affiliated analysts to look favorably 
on issuing firms, and market participants do in fact discount the announcement of buy recommendations 
by lead underwriter analysts.  Lin and McNichols (1998) report significantly more negative three-day 
returns on the announcement of lead underwriter analyst hold recommendations than on unaffiliated 
analyst hold recommendations in the SEO market.  This suggests investors expect lead underwriter 
analysts are more likely to recommend a hold when they really mean sell.  To control for market 
expectations, we also categorize by rating position relative to the consensus. 
Surprising the market with extremely positive or extremely negative ratings is informative when 
analyst teams are affiliated with mutual funds.  However, markets react significantly more to good news 
reported by these analysts.  The median price impact of a strong buy assigned by analysts affiliated with 
mutual funds is 1.03% (the mean is 1.70%).  This abnormal return is significantly higher than the change 
reported by stocks receiving strong buys from unaffiliated analyst teams, 0.68% (the mean is 1.29%).  A 
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issue a negative rating that is less favorable than the consensus, stocks display a slightly more negative 
abnormal return than stocks rated that way by unaffiliated analysts (the difference is significant at the 3% 
level).  In a result different from that for analyst teams affiliated with investment banks, a rating of hold 
here does not mean sell, but rather underperform.   
 
IV. Multivariate Analysis 
In quarter t, each analyst team i decides either to release a report or to be silent on stock j.  This 
choice is not independent of choices made previously.  Relative to the previous quarter t-1, in quarter t 
analyst teams select one of four observable outcomes or behaviors: issuing another research report, 
switching to silence (pausing in coverage), continuing to be silent, or breaking the silence with a new 
report.  We define the choice of covering a stock with at least one report as a failure event sampled at a 
quarterly frequency.  Consequently, our study of the decision to continue research coverage is framed as a 
multiple failure-time analysis, also called multivariate survival analysis.  
A. Multivariate Survival Analysis 
Recurrent event data are frequently encountered in biomedical and economics investigations. 
They naturally arise from time-to-occurrence studies when either two or more failure events may occur 
for each individual observation unit or subject.  In our study, the subject is a unique pair of analyst team i 
and stock j, and the “failure” consists of issuing a report in quarter t.  We treat the failures according to a 
conditional risk set model (Prentice, Williams, and Peterson, 1981): A subject is not at risk of a second 
event until the first event has occurred, and so on.  Thus, the conditional risk set at time t for the event n 
concerns only all subjects under observation that have experienced event n-1.  Formally, let Z(t) denote 
the vector of covariates at time t≥0, and N(t) the number of failures prior to time t.  The counting process 
for N(t) is described by a random variable, assumed to be continuous.  The hazard or intensity function 
λ(t) is defined as the instantaneous rate of failure at time t, given the covariates and counting processes at 
time t:                       () {} () { } t   ) t ( Z ), t ( N | t t T t   Pr lim   t Z ), t ( N | t   1 t n 0 t Δ Δ λ
Δ + < ≤ = + →
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the history of decisions on whether to issue reports.  In practice, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard 
model of the form:  () {} ]   Z '   exp[ ) t (   t Z | t   t 0 β λ λ = , where λ{⋅} is called the hazard function, and λ0{⋅} 
is a baseline hazard that describes the probability of no reports being issued when all the explanatory 
variables are set to zero.  We estimate the baseline hazard non-parametrically and the vector β illustrating 
the impact of the explanatory variables in Zt by maximum likelihood. The non-parametric data-driven 
nature of the estimate of λ0{⋅} makes empirical results considerably robust. 
By construction, our sample consists of analyst teams covering stocks in 1994.  The last quarter 
of 1994 marks date 0, and data are left-censored by construction.  We count the initial failure that is 
common to all stocks in our sample as a zero event.  The counting process ranges then from zero to 22 
(the maximum number of reports written across all stocks) failure events over 36 quarters.  Time-varying 
covariates for the probability of continuing the coverage are: 
λ{t/N(t), Z(MARKET RETURNt, S&P500 COMPONENTt dummy, NASDAQ-LISTEDt dummy, AMEX-
LISTEDt dummy, OTHER  EXCHANGESt dummy, UTILITYt dummy, TECHt dummy, LNASSETSt-1, 
MARKET-BOOK  VALUE R ATIOt-1, EPSt-1, ASSET T URNOVER R ATIOt-1, ROEt-1, DIVIDEND Y IELDt-1, 
LEVERAGE R ATIOt-1, PRICE  EXCEEDING  200-DAY  MOVING  AVERAGEt dummy, SEOt dummy, 
ANALYST TEAM SIZEt, AFFILIATION WITH INVESTMENT BANKt dummy, SWITCH OF INVESTMENT BANKt  
dummy, AFFILIATION WITH MUTUAL FUNDSt-1 dummy)} 
 
The first seven covariates relate to market conditions and firm characteristics.  MARKET RETURN 
is determined by using the CRSP value-weighted NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq index.  S&P500 COMPONENT is a 
dummy equal to one when the stock is included in the Standard & Poor’s 500 at the end of each quarter.  
NASDAQ-LISTED, AMEX-LISTED, and OTHER EXCHANGES are dummies for the listing on the Nasdaq, 
Amex, and regional exchanges.  UTILITY and TECH are dummies equal to one when companies operate, 
respectively, in the two-digit SIC industry 49, and in the four-digit SIC codes specified in Loughran and 
Ritter (2004). 
To avoid a look-ahead bias, all accounting indicators refer to the prior quarter, t-1.  LNASSETS is 
the natural logarithm of total assets.  MARKET-BOOK VALUE RATIO is defined as the sum of the market 
value of equity and the book values of long-term debt and preferred stock, divided by the book value of 
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divided by the book value of equity.  DIVIDEND YIELD is quarterly dividends per share divided by the 
closing price at the end of the quarter.  LEVERAGE RATIO is long-term debt divided by the book value of 
equity.  PRICE EXCEEDING 200-DAY MOVING AVERAGE, equal to one when the daily price happens to 
exceed the 200-day arithmetic moving average in quarter t, is intended to capture momentum in the 
decision to research a firm.  SEO is a dummy variable equal to one when the company makes a new 
equity offering in quarter t. 
To account for analyst team characteristics, ANALYST TEAM SIZE is defined as the IBES number 
of analysts working for a research department.  Consider that analyst team size can also be regarded as a 
proxy of the research department reputation.  AFFILIATION WITH INVESTMENT BANK has a value of one 
when the analyst team is affiliated with an investment bank in the managing syndicate for the stock 
covered.  SWITCH OF INVESTMENT  BANK is equal to one when the issuing firm switches to a new 
investment bank as a member of the managing syndicate for new securities.  This dummy variable marks 
the end to the firm’s relationship with an investment bank that was used during a prior equity or debt 
issue.   AFFILIATION WITH MUTUAL FUNDS has a value of one when the analyst team is affiliated with 
mutual funds holding, in quarter t-1, the stock covered. 
Table VIII reports the coefficients for the Cox regression model.  Lin and Wei’s (1989) 
heteroscedasticity-robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Stratifying by failure order allows us to 
explain the probability that analyst teams will continue issuing reports on stocks.  Regression 6 confirms 
the results of the univariate analysis.  Stocks in the S&P 500 index, or listed on the NYSE, and reporting 
good accounting and financial performance are consistently covered over time.  For instance, once we 
account for the persistence in research coverage, the coefficient of ASSET TURNOVER RATIO is positive 
and significant as expected.  Firm size in terms of book value of assets is inversely associated with the 
probability the stock will be followed.  An analyst team’s choice of covering a stock is also affected by 
price momentum and an SEO.   
The last three regressors in specification 6 are directly useful in testing the hypothesis of interest.  
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between analyst team and investment bank, positively affects analysts’ decision to continue providing 
research on a stock.  Although hazard ratios are not reported in Table VIII, they support a clearer 
interpretation than the coefficients.  In fact, when an issuer selects an investment bank different from its 
original underwriter to manage an offering of new securities, the probability that the original underwriter 
will continue reporting on the stock declines by 26%.  Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) suggest that 
one reason companies change to a new underwriter for managing an SEO is to get higher-quality research 
coverage.  The flip side of the coin seems to be that, once an investment bank is no longer an underwriter, 
the affiliated analyst team has no incentive to maintain continuous coverage on the stock.  Finally, the 
mutual fund affiliation also drives the decision to continue covering a stock.  When affiliated mutual 
funds have been investing in the equity of a certain company in quarter t-1, the probability that stock will 
be covered in quarter t rises by 21%. 
We also estimate a number of Cox regression models that define the “failure” event as the 
decision of an analyst team to issue at time t a recommendation that is better than the quarterly consensus. 
Intuitively, this would be a model for the conditional probability of research teams to continue to assign 
favorable ratings.  The probability of being (absolutely) favorable toward a stock is explained by the same 
covariates related to market conditions, firm characteristics, accounting and financial performance, and 
research team features.  In Table IX we do not stratify the estimates in the first seven models.  That is, for 
the purposes of these seven models, we assume time series independence in the ratings analysts assign 
over time.  Regression 8 in that table uses the stratification option to capture potential persistence in the 
decision to issue favorable recommendations. 
In the first four regressions of Table IX all coefficients related to market conditions, firm 
characteristics and performance indicators have the expected signs and are significant, except for dividend 
yield and leverage ratio.  The larger the covered company, the less likely it is to receive a rating better 
than the consensus.  Utility stocks appear to be under-rated, while tech stocks attract very favorable 
ratings.  Some performance indicators drive analyst team optimism.  The higher the earnings per share 
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Once we include analyst team characteristics in Regression 5, both affiliation dummies have 
positive and significant coefficients.  When mutual funds hold a stock, the affiliated analyst team is 51% 
more likely to look favorably on that stock-issuing firm in its reports than unaffiliated teams (32% more 
likely to continue looking favorably on that firm).  
What drives the optimism of the analyst team affiliated with mutual funds?  Does the investment 
size by mutual funds affect affiliated analyst optimism?  The answer to these questions is found in 
Regression model 6.  This model focuses on the subsample of relationships between analyst team i and 
stock j characterized by affiliation with mutual funds at time t-1.  In particular, this model replaces the 
AFFILIATION WITH MUTUAL FUNDS dummy with three variables for the investment size: HOLDINGS BY 
AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS, WEIGHT IN AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS and LN(MONEY INVESTED BY 
AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS).  HOLDINGS BY AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS are defined as the percent 
ratio between shares held by affiliated mutual funds at the end of the quarter t-1 divided by all shares 
outstanding.  WEIGHT IN AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS is the percentage of the dollar amount invested in 
stock j by the affiliated money manager divided by all 13f holdings in quarter t-1.  LN(MONEY INVESTED 
BY AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS) is the natural logarithm of the amount invested, in million of dollars, by 
affiliated mutual funds in stock j.  Investment is defined as number of shares held multiplied by the stock 
price at the end of quarter t-1. 
Also, Regression 6 includes two more variables.  The first variable, ALL-STAR ANALYST, is a 
dummy equal to one when the analyst assigning the rating belongs to the All-American Research Team as 
selected by Institutional Investor every October.  The second variable, HOLDINGS BY ALL  MUTUAL 
FUNDS, controls for the overall presence of institutional investors in a firm’s equity.  All institutional 
investors with over $100 million assets under management must disclose their holdings on a quarterly 
basis.  We use CDA/Spectrum to determine HOLDINGS BY ALL MUTUAL FUNDS as the percent ratio 
between shares held by all mutual funds at the end of quarter t-1 divided by all shares outstanding.  Like 
Ljungqvist et al. (2005), we expect the presence of institutional investors to moderate analyst optimism. 
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DIVIDEND  YIELD  change sign.   The coefficient of ANALYST  TEAM  SIZE now becomes significantly 
negative.  If the size of an analyst team is regarded as a proxy of its reputation, the larger research 
departments are less likely to assign extremely positive ratings compared to the consensus. 
The coefficients of the last three explanatory variables in model 6 are all significant.  Institutional 
presence does play a moderating role on analyst optimism.  All-stars are particularly associated with 
extremely optimistic ratings.  The more money invested in a firm’s equity by affiliated mutual funds, the 
more optimistic the rating assigned.  For instance, when a mutual fund increases the amount invested in a 
stock from the first quartile ($1.50 million) to the median ($7.29 million at the end of 2003) of the 
holding distribution, the probability that an affiliated analyst issues a recommendation more favorable 
than the consensus increases by 13% (29% from the first quartile to the third quartile, $37.14 million). 
In Regression 7 we simply remove HOLDINGS BY AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS and WEIGHT IN 
AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS from the prior model.  The coefficient of the logarithm of money invested 
does not change in magnitude or in significance.  Finally, Regression 8 of Table IX, which stratifies 
estimates by failure order, captures the time persistence in assigning optimistic ratings.  The affiliation 
with an investment bank again affects the decision to continue covering a stock but does not explain the 
continuing optimism in the ratings.  On the contrary, the affiliation with mutual funds is a relevant 
determinant of both decisions. 
B. Robustness checks 
We apply a number of robustness checks to our empirical results.  We want to make sure first that 
our findings on the importance of the mutual fund affiliation do not depend entirely on the survival 
analysis approach.  We start by applying standard probit regression methods to the probability that analyst 
teams will issue a report on a given stock (see Johnson and Marietta-Westberg (2005)).  While survival 
analysis models the conditional probability of failure, standard probit assumes independence over time.  
Untabulated results systematically replicate the models estimated in Table VIII.  The correspondence 
between signs and significance levels for most variables is striking.  Focusing on model 6 in Table VIII, 
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predict a lower probability of coverage), but both of them do not directly relate to our main hypothesis.  
The main result remains that both types of affiliations increase the probability that a given stock will be 
covered, and in both cases with highly significant (robust) z-statistics.  Interestingly, the same results are 
obtained either by bootstrapping the standard errors of the probit or by estimating a logistic regression.  
This shows that our results on the determinants of coverage do not depend on modeling persistence in 
behavior by survival methods. 
Second, we extend probit and logit methods to the other dependent variable of interest: the 
probability that analyst teams may assign a rating more favorable than the consensus.  Estimated 
coefficients are reported in the first column (All Period) of Table X.  Although a few of the (robust) z-
scores decline from the results of Table IX, this does not occur for the variables of interest.  In particular, 
analyst teams covering stocks highly represented in the portfolios of affiliated institutional investors keep 
issuing recommendations significantly more favorable than the consensus.  The associated estimated 
coefficients are significant. 
Third, we expand the set of variables controlling for general business cycle conditions to include 
lagged values of the growth rate of standard macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP, inflation (as 
measured by the CPI), and the Federal funds rate.  Interestingly, the macro controls are highly significant 
and they show the expected signs – i.e. better general conditions foster optimistic recommendations.  
Although the contemporaneous market return loses its significance, all other variables of interest maintain 
the same sign as in the first column of Table X, and most estimated coefficients hardly change value or 
significance level. 
Fourth, one might ask how robust the results are to subsample analysis.  In the context of survival 
(conditional) analyses, this is far from a natural question, as dividing a sample into subperiods would alter 
the natural structure in terms of baseline period 0 and dynamics of the phenomenon over subsequent 
periods.  Thus we use probit techniques as they actually assume temporal independence of the failure 
event, defined as an analyst team assigning a rating above the consensus.  Table X reports probit 
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would expect.  The signs of a few firm- or stock-specific control variables become unstable.
4  Once more 
our main insights turn out to be exceptionally robust over time.  As an example, the positive estimated 
coefficient relating the probability of optimistic recommendations to the importance of a stock in the 
portfolio of an affiliated institutional investor does not seem to depend on any precise period.  The 
tendency of all-stars to issue favorable ratings is higher during the bubble period, but remains significant 
and positive throughout. 
Finally, we experiment with the random effects generalized least squares (GLS) three-way panel 
models that Ljungqvist et al. (2005) use in a related application.  Similarly, we model a continuous 
indicator of analyst team optimism − defined as the ratio between the team’s rating and the consensus − as 
a function of the combination of firm/stock characteristics as well as research team features, already 
specified in Table IX (columns 7-8) and Table X.  We obtain two distinct sets of GLS coefficient 
estimates, depending on whether we model analyst team- or firm/stock-level unobserved heterogeneity.
5  
A larger institutional investor presence in the firm’s equity makes optimism less likely, whatever the 
econometric framework.  Yet, both types of research team affiliations make optimism more likely.   
C. Simultaneity issues 
Both univariate and multivariate models and a variety of econometric techniques show that the 
affiliation with mutual funds is associated with a more continuing and favorable analyst coverage. 
However, these results do not establish a causal link, i.e. they do not prove that this affiliation causes the 
analysts to behave differently.  In particular, one may worry that a simultaneous effect may be occurring: 
                                                 
4 In some cases, the sign switches are illusory because the corresponding coefficients fail to be significant at 
standard size levels across estimated models. The only statistically significant case involves market returns, although 
the intuition is straightforward; during 2002-2003, market prices generally declined while analyst teams − under the 
pressure of impending new regulations − paid considerable attention to increasing the coverage provided and to 
reducing the bias of recommendations. 
5 Formally, Opt
i,j
t is a variable measuring the optimism (relative to the consensus) of research team i on stock j at 
time t. The idea of random effects panel analysis is to decompose the general random error term ε
i,j
t into the sum υi 
+ ηj + ωt. Each error term represents unobserved heterogeneity of optimism across research teams, stocks, and over 
time. Following Ljungqvist et al. (2005), we simplify the estimation problem by experimenting with either research 
team and time heterogeneity or firm and time heterogeneity.  Provided the two sets of coefficients are similar, as it 
turns out to be the case in our results, choosing one or the other assumption will make little difference. 
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concerning the analysts’ incentives might be established.
6  
To explore this hypothesis we proceed to estimate random effects panel regressions where the 
change (between quarter t-1 and quarter t) in the shares held by affiliated mutual funds is explained by a 
number of variables, including optimism of the in-house analysts in quarter t-1.
7  Under the null 
hypothesis that mutual fund affiliation causes analysts’ behaviors (hence, of no simultaneity), we expect 
that analyst optimism will fail to significantly explain the subsequent portfolio rearrangements of in-
house mutual funds.
  
As reported in columns 1 of Table XI, we find that past optimism of affiliated analysts fails to 
explain changes in the holdings.  We obtain two sets of GLS coefficient estimates, depending on whether 
we model analyst team- or firm/stock-level unobserved heterogeneity.  At both levels, change in the 
institutional presence is the main significant explanatory factor with a positive coefficient.  We find no 
evidence that favorable ratings are followed by any significant change in holdings by in-house mutual 
funds.  Overall, the evidence is at odds with a two-way simultaneous feedback system and supports 
instead the idea that affiliation causes analysts to behave differently and be more favorable toward stocks 
in portfolios of the in-house asset managers.
8
In columns 2, we replicate the analysis using variables reflecting the contemporaneous optimism 
(in quarter t) of in-house analysts, and find identical results.  This version of the model reflects the 
possibility that information may efficiently flow within universal banks, so that analyst optimism may be 
reflected in the contemporaneous portfolio behavior of the affiliated funds.  Random effects regressions 
                                                 
6 Unfortunately, we are unable to control whether analysts provide research (or simply tips) to mutual fund managers 
before they release their reports to the public.  If this actually occurs, the highly regarded all-star analysts are more 
likely to affect portfolio rearrangements. 
7 Analyst ratings are either based on the first report or on the last available report for the quarter, in case of more 
reports issued by analyst team i on stock j in one quarter.  In the latter case, the mutual funds have a longer time to 
adjust their portfolios. We find that the results are insensitive to this choice. 
8 We collect some evidence of a negative association between favorable analyst ratings and change in portfolio 
weight.  In other words, asset managers are likely to sell stocks in the wake of favorable recommendations. The 
most important explanatory variables are the changes in market-book value, asset turnover, and stock price.  In 
general, there is evidence that mutual funds prefer companies with stronger fundamentals, consistent with the 
findings in Field and Lowry (2005). Detailed results are available on request. 
  29fail again to highlight any significant effect of analyst optimism on mutual fund behavior.  Also, when all-
star analysts release a rating more favorable than the consensus, the affiliated mutual funds will not 
significantly change their holdings in the covered stock.   
 
V. Conclusion 
What makes an analyst’s research on seasoned stocks persistently optimistic?  After studying 
16,824 ties between analyst teams and established listed companies for over 36 quarters from 1995 to 
2003, we find analyst decisions to continue covering seasoned stocks are influenced by their affiliations 
with investment banks and mutual funds.  Yet analyst decisions to assign persistently optimistic ratings 
are influenced by their affiliation with only mutual funds.  From the beginning of the sample period 
through 2001, we report that analysts were significantly optimistic about stocks that were held by 
affiliated mutual funds.  In particular, in the 1999-2001 subperiod, firms with low growth prospects or 
accounting performance received favorable ratings, and ratings that were even better than the consensus.  
In the last years of our sample period, from 2002 to 2003, analyst ratings became pessimistic. 
Controlling for several factors including the presence of other institutional investors, our results 
show the more invested in a stock by affiliated mutual funds, the higher the level of analyst optimism.  
We argue that, when mutual funds invest significant amounts in stocks that are less visible to other 
investors, the affiliated analysts have an incentive to look favorably on them.  Promoting stocks with a 
“strong buy” that beats the consensus produces a median three-day abnormal return of 1.03% around the 
report day (1.70% mean return). 
This study provides some insight into the competing pressures analysts face within universal 
banks and the related problems in developing an effective regulatory framework.  While the new NASD, 
NYSE and SEC rules restrict communications between investment banks and affiliated research 
departments, our results highlight the significance of the relationship between research teams and 
affiliated portfolio managers.  Recent news of mutual-fund trading abuses that involve large brokerage 
houses and their favored institutional clients provide evidence to support further research on this second 
linkage. 
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  32Table I 
 
Descriptive Statistics as of End of 1994 
 
  End 1994  
   
Number of Analyst Teams  154 
Number of Covered Stocks  4,121 
   
Average Number of Stocks Covered by Each Analyst Team  109.25 
Proportion of Stocks in the S&P 500  29.02% 
Proportion of NYSE-Listed Stocks  58.78% 
Proportion of Utility Stocks  6.83% 
Proportion of Tech Stocks  7.49% 
Proportion of Stocks Underwritten by Affiliated Investment Bank  20.80% 
Proportion of Stocks Held by Affiliated Mutual Funds  25.61% 
Proportion of Stocks Both Underwritten by Affiliated Investment Bank 
and Held by Affiliated Mutual Funds 
6.04% 
   
Quarterly Coverage Rate  27.87% 
   
 
At the end of 1994, the sample is composed by 16,824 observations as pairs of analyst team i and stock j (i = 1, 
2, …, 154, j = 1, 2, …,  4,121).  Each analyst team covers at least 1 stock (with a maximum of 976).  Different 
analyst teams may cover the same stock.  About 94% of the stocks are listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), the Nasdaq, or the American Stock Exchange (Amex).  Remaining stocks are traded over-the-counter 
or on regional exchanges. Utility companies operate in the two-digit SIC industry of 49; tech companies are 
defined as in the four-digit SIC codes reported in Loughran and Ritter (2004).  Stocks are said to be covered by 
an analyst team affiliated with an investment bank when the affiliated investment bank served as manager in the 
syndicates of the most recent seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), convertible and non-convertible debt issues or 
at the time of the initial public offering (IPO).  Stocks are said to be covered by an analyst team affiliated with 
mutual funds when the affiliated mutual funds hold them in quarter t-1.  The quarterly coverage rate is the total 
number of observations with at least one report during the fourth quarter of 1994 divided by the number of 
active observations at the end of that quarter.  Data are from IBES, CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, and 
CDA/Spectrum Institutional Money Manager (13f) Holdings. 
 
  33Table II 
 
Average Quarterly Coverage Rate 
Categorized by Firm Characteristics and Subperiods 
 
Subperiods   
1995-2003  1995-1998 1999-2001  2002-2003 








Stocks in the S&P 500  14.20%  15.00%  10.63%  18.70% 
NYSE-Listed Stocks  12.73%  13.94%  9.11%  15.40% 
Nasdaq-Listed Stocks  11.20%  13.22%  7.27%  9.93% 
Amex-Listed Stocks  7.07%  9.41%  2.60%  3.47% 
Stocks Traded on Other Exchanges   8.42%  10.54%  3.64%  4.48% 
Utility Stocks  9.77%  10.82%  5.60%  14.42% 
Tech Stocks  12.62%  14.96%  8.38%  11.67% 
Stocks Underwritten by Affiliated Investment Bank  13.97%  15.61%  9.46%  16.58% 
Stocks Held by Affiliated Mutual Funds  13.91%  15.01%  9.95%  16.55% 
Stocks Both Underwritten by Affiliated Investment Bank 
and Held by Affiliated Mutual Funds 
16.26% 17.38% 11.44%  21.75% 
 
The average quarterly coverage rate is determined as the total number of observations with at least one report 
during the period divided by the number of active observations at the end of that period.  All firm characteristics 
are time-varying.  About 6% of the stocks are traded over-the-counter or on regional exchanges. Utility 
companies operate in the two-digit SIC industry of 49; tech companies are defined as in the four-digit SIC codes 
reported in Loughran and Ritter (2004).  Stocks are covered by an analyst team affiliated with investment banks 
when the affiliated investment bank served as a manager in the syndicates of the most recent SEOs, debt issues 
or at the time of the IPO. Stocks are covered by an analyst team affiliated with mutual funds when the affiliated 
mutual funds hold them in quarter t-1.  
 
  34Table III 
 
Median Performance Indicators of Stocks Receiving Quarterly Coverage  
Categorized by Subperiods 
 
 
1995-1998 1999-2001  2002-2003 
Time  Reports 
No 
Reports  P-value Reports
No 
Reports P-value  Reports 
No 
Reports P-value
                  
MBV Ratio  1.22  1.16  0.0000  1.22 1.03 0.0000  1.05  0.98 0.0000 
EPS $0.37  $0.33  0.0000  $0.36 $0.32 0.0000  $0.35  $0.28 0.0000 
Asset Turnover  0.23  0.22  0.0000  0.20 0.21 0.0007 0.16  0.18 0.0000 
Return on Equity  3.59%  3.34%  0.0000  3.51% 3.18% 0.0000  3.00%  2.68% 0.0000 
Dividend Yield  0.83%  0.74%  0.0000  1.06% 0.76% 0.0000  1.32%  0.81% 0.0000 
Leverage Ratio  0.46  0.47  0.0297  0.56 0.58 0.9593 0.65  0.57 0.0000 




76.43% 71.15% 0.0000  70.11% 67.22% 0.0000  72.34%  65.39% 0.0000 
              
No. of Active 
Observations  30,363 196,008  9,097 102,116 6,837  43,559
              
 
All median values are determined in the quarter prior to the one when the report is released.  MBV ratio is defined 
as the sum of the market value of equity and the book values of long-term debt and preferred stock, divided by 
book value of total assets.  Return on equity is earnings divided by the book value of equity.  Dividend yield is 
quarterly dividends per share divided by the closing price at the end of the each quarter. Asset turnover is defined 
as quarterly sales divided by the total assets.  Leverage ratio is long-term debt divided by book value of equity.  
P-values are for two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests of difference between medians. 
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Average Rating Divided by Consensus 
by Analyst Team Affiliation and Performance Indicators 
 
 
Panel A: Analyst Teams Affiliated with Investment Banks 




















Teams  P-value 
                
High  MBV  1.06 1.07  0.1940  1.00 1.03  0.0570  1.10 1.09  0.6276 
Low  MBV  1.01 1.04  0.0037  1.00 1.01  0.6116  1.08 1.07  0.4462 
                
High EPS  1.03  1.06  0.0011  1.01  1.03 0.1400 1.09  1.09  0.8419 
Low  EPS  1.05 1.06  0.2771  1.00 1.02  0.1729  1.09 1.07  0.4423 
                
High Asset Turnover  1.04  1.07  0.0013 1.02  1.03  0.4641 1.07  1.07  0.7684 
Low Asset Turnover  1.04  1.05  0.2290 0.99  1.02  0.0305 1.11  1.09  0.3053 
                
High  ROE  1.04 1.07  0.0012  1.01 1.04  0.0392  1.10 1.09  0.5408 
Low  ROE  1.04 1.05  0.7161  1.00 1.01  0.6339  1.08 1.07  0.5433 
                
High Dividend Yield  1.03  1.04  0.0333  0.99  1.02  0.0535  1.09  1.08  0.4219 
Low Dividend Yield  1.05  1.08  0.0005  1.01  1.04  0.1020  1.09  1.09  0.9765 
                
High Leverage  1.02  1.05  0.0002  1.01 1.01  0.6368  1.09 1.08  0.7575 
Low  Leverage  1.06 1.07  0.7191  1.00 1.03  0.0234  1.09 1.08  0.4093 
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Panel B: Analyst Teams Affiliated with Mutual Funds 




















Teams  P-value 
                
High  MBV  1.04 1.09  0.0000  1.01 1.05  0.0004  1.10 1.07  0.0420 
Low  MBV  1.02 1.04  0.0111  0.99 1.03  0.0006  1.08 1.04  0.0034 
                
High EPS  1.03  1.07  0.0000  1.01  1.04 0.0037 1.10  1.07  0.0690 
Low  EPS  1.03 1.06  0.0004  0.99 1.04  0.0000  1.09 1.05  0.0079 
                
High Asset Turnover  1.03  1.08  0.0000 1.02  1.04  0.1607 1.08  1.06  0.1263 
Low Asset Turnover  1.03  1.05  0.0080 0.98  1.05  0.0000 1.11  1.07  0.0034 
                
High  ROE  1.04 1.08  0.0000  1.01 1.05  0.0047  1.10 1.07  0.0700 
Low  ROE  1.03 1.05  0.0033  0.97 1.04  0.0000  1.09 1.05  0.0036 
                
High Dividend Yield  1.02  1.06  0.0000  0.99  1.04  0.0000  1.09  1.06  0.0620 
Low Dividend Yield  1.05  1.08  0.0008  1.01  1.05  0.0073  1.11  1.06  0.0084 
                
High Leverage  1.02  1.05  0.0000  0.99 1.04  0.0000  1.09 1.05  0.0052 
Low  Leverage  1.05 1.08  0.0000  1.01 1.04  0.0031  1.09 1.06  0.0518 
                














Recommendations are scaled by the quarterly consensus, which is the mean rating assigned by all securities analysts covering a given stock.  
The recommendation score ranges from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (sell). When the same analyst team releases more than one report on a stock during 
the quarter t, the first rating is the one included. An analyst team is regarded as affiliated with the investment bank when the affiliated 
investment bank is in the managing syndicate for the issuing firm covered by the team.  An analyst team is regarded as affiliated with a mutual 
fund when the affiliated mutual funds hold, in quarter t-1, the stock covered by the team. Performance indicators are called high when higher 
than the quarterly median.  All performance indicators are one-quarter lagged.  The p-values for differences within subsample means are from 
standard t-tests for difference in means.     
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Average Rating Assigned by All-Star Analysts 
by Affiliation with Mutual Funds and Performance Indicators 
 
 




















Analysts  P-value 
                  
High MBV  1.04  1.09  0.0003  0.99  1.09  0.0001  1.11  1.13  0.4085 
Low MBV  1.01  1.03  0.1148  0.95  1.02  0.0135  1.08  1.12  0.2554 
                  
High EPS  1.03  1.06  0.0219  0.98  1.06 0.0015 1.10  1.14  0.1503 
Low EPS  1.03  1.07  0.0138  0.96  1.04  0.0067  1.10  1.13  0.8300 
                  
High Asset Turnover  1.02  1.07  0.0009 0.99  1.06 0.0178 1.07  1.09  0.5362 
Low Asset Turnover  1.03  1.05  0.2071 0.95  1.04 0.0006 1.13  1.17  0.1664 
                  
High ROE  1.03  1.06  0.0068  0.98  1.06  0.0019  1.09  1.11  0.4339 
Low ROE  1.03  1.06  0.0665  0.95  1.03  0.0055  1.11  1.13  0.4668 
                  
High Dividend Yield  1.01  1.06  0.0009  0.97  1.03  0.0059  1.08  1.13  0.0493 
Low Dividend Yield  1.05  1.06  0.3056  0.98  1.07  0.0022  1.11  1.13  0.7007 
                  
High Leverage  1.01  1.05  0.0019  0.96 1.04  0.0011  1.10 1.10  0.9552 
Low Leverage  1.05  1.08  0.1038  0.98  1.06  0.0095  1.09  1.15  0.0801 
                  













Recommendations are scaled by the quarterly consensus, which is the mean rating assigned by all securities analysts covering a given stock. The 
recommendation score ranges from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (sell). When the same analyst team releases more than one report on a stock during the quarter t, 
the first rating is the one included. All-star analysts are identified by using the annual All-American Research ranking issued by Institutional Investor 
every October. An all-star analyst is regarded as affiliated with the mutual funds when the affiliated mutual funds hold, in quarter t-1, the stock covered. 
Performance indicators are called high when higher than the quarterly median.  The p-values for differences within subsample means are from standard 
t-tests for difference in means.     
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Table VI 
 
Average Rating and Amounts Invested by Affiliated Mutual Funds 
 
 
Panel A: All Sample 
Subperiods 
Terciles 1995-2003  1995-1998 1999-2001  2002-2003 
Small Investment (1)  1.05  1.04  1.01  1.13 
Medium Investment (2)  1.04  1.03  1.00  1.11 
Large Investment (3)  1.03  1.03  0.99  1.07 
P-value (3) – (1)  0.0130  0.3573  0.1696  0.0005 
 
Panel B: Subsample of All-Star Analysts 
Subperiods 
Terciles 1995-2003  1995-1998 1999-2001 2002-2003 
Small Investment (1)  1.07  1.05  1.01  1.18 
Medium Investment (2)  1.05  1.04  0.98  1.12 
Large Investment (3)  1.01  1.01  0.95  1.06 
P-value (3) – (1)  0.0000  0.0414  0.0278  0.0000 
 
Recommendations are scaled by the quarterly consensus, which is the mean rating in the research industry.  The 
recommendation score ranges from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (sell). When the same analyst team releases more than 
one report on a stock during the quarter t, the first rating is the one included. An analyst team is regarded as 
affiliated with the mutual funds when the affiliated mutual funds hold in quarter t-1 the stock covered by the 
analyst team in quarter t.  Investment is defined as the dollar amount of the shares held by the mutual funds at 
the end of the quarter t-1.  P-values for differences within subsample means are from standard t-tests for 
difference in means. Data are from IBES, CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, and CDA/Spectrum Institutional 
Money Manager (13f) Holdings.    Table VII 
 
Median Three-Day Abnormal Returns around the Report Day 













Analyst Teams  P-value
1 = Strong Buy   1.03% 
N=5,157 
0.68% 
N=8,764  0.0000  -- --  -- 
2 = Buy  0.35% 
N=4,358 
0.26% 






N=4,839  0.8886 
≥ 3 = Hold or Worse  -0.49% 
N=399 
-0.33% 









N=16,583  0.0000  -0.51% 
N=11,868 
-0.44% 
N=18,813  0.0558 
 
Three-day market-adjusted returns are determined by using the CRSP equally weighted NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq 
index.  Day 0 marks the report date.  To control for dependence of returns, a 255-trading day estimation period 
starting 46 days before the event date is used.  Cross-sectional abnormal returns are calculated using Eventus
® 
Software.  The p-values are for a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.  All median abnormal 
returns are different from zero at the 1% level except those with * superscript.  
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Table VIII 
 
Cox Regression for Probability that Analyst Teams Will Continue Releasing Reports 
 





























































































PRICE EXCEEDING 200-DAY MOVING 
AVERAGEt dummy 














ANALYST TEAM SIZE t




AFFILIATION WITH INVESTMENT BANKt 
dummy 








AFFILIATION WITH MUTUAL FUNDSt-1 
dummy 




Wald Chi-squared  1,745.12 4,705.92 1,634.99 2,710.12  4,429.73  3,585.83
Prob > Chi-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of Failures  46,297  46,297  42,342  42,342  46,155  42,205 
Number of Observations  605,664 605,664 414,300  414,300  605,006  413,675 
   42
Failure event is the release of one or more reports on stock i by the analyst team j in the quarter t. Analysis 
time is on 36 quarters, over 1995-2003, where last quarter 1994 represents time 0. Cox regression (Breslow 
method for ties) results are stratified by failure order. The hazard function is as follows. 
 
λ{t/N(t), Z(MARKET RETURNt, S&P500 COMPONENTt dummy, NASDAQ-LISTEDt dummy, AMEX-LISTEDt dummy, 
OTHER EXCHANGESt dummy, UTILITYt dummy, TECHt dummy, LNASSETSt-1, MARKET-BOOK VALUE RATIOt-1, EPSt-
1, ASSETS T URNOVER R ATIOt-1, ROEt-1, DIVIDEND Y IELDt-1, LEVERAGE R ATIOt-1, PRICE  EXCEEDING  200-DAY 
MOVING AVERAGEt dummy, SEOt dummy, ANALYST TEAM SIZEt, AFFILIATION WITH INVESTMENT BANKt dummy, 
SWITCH OF INVESTMENT BANKt dummy, AFFILIATION WITH MUTUAL FUNDSt-1 dummy)} 
 
All covariates are time-varying variables. MARKET  RETURN is determined by using the CRSP value-
weighted NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq index. S&P500 COMPONENT is a dummy equal to one when the stock is 
included in the Standard and Poor’s 500 at the end of each quarter. UTILITY and TECH are dummies equal to 
one when companies operate, respectively, in the two-digit SIC industry of 49, and in the four-digit SIC 
codes specified in Loughran and Ritter (2004). Performance indicators refer to the prior quarter, t-1. 
LNASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets in million of dollars.  MARKET-BOOK VALUE RATIO is 
defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the book values of long-term debt and preferred stock, 
divided by the book value of total assets.  ROE is equal to quarterly earnings divided by the book value of 
equity.  DIVIDEND YIELD is defined as quarterly dividends per share divided by the closing price at the end 
of the each quarter. ASSET TURNOVER RATIO is quarterly sales divided by total assets.  LEVERAGE RATIO is 
long-term debt divided by the book value of equity. PRICE EXCEEDING 200-DAY MOVING AVERAGE is equal 
to one when the daily price happens to exceed the 200-day arithmetic moving average in quarter t. SEO is a 
dummy variable equal to one when the company realizes a new equity offering in quarter t.  ANALYST TEAM 
SIZE is the number of analysts in the team. AFFILIATION WITH INVESTMENT BANK has value one when the 
analyst team is affiliated with the investment bank serving as member of the managing syndicate for the 
stock covered.  SWITCH OF INVESTMENT BANK is equal to one when the investment bank is no longer 
selected as a member of the managing syndicate for underwriting new securities. AFFILIATION WITH 
MUTUAL FUNDS has value one when the analyst team is affiliated with the mutual funds holding the stock 
covered. Lin and Wei’s (1989) heteroscedasticity-adjusted z-statistics are in parentheses.  
 Table IX 
 
Cox Regression for Probability that Analyst Teams Will Assign 
Favorable (Better-than-Consensus) Ratings  
 

















































































































































































PRICE EXCEEDING 200-DAY MOVING 
AVERAGEt dummy 

































AFFILIATION WITH INVESTMENT BANKt 
dummy 
















AFFILIATION WITH MUTUAL FUNDSt-1 
dummy 
      0.41 
(23.39) -- --  -- 
HOLDINGS BY AFFILIATED MUTUAL 
FUNDSt-1
      --  0.00 
(0.56)  -- -- 
WEIGHT IN AFFILIATED MUTUAL 
FUNDSt-1
      --  -0.01 
(-0.52)  -- -- 
LN(MONEY INVESTED BY AFFILIATED 
MUTUAL FUNDS)t-1






HOLDINGS BY ALL MUTUAL FUNDSt-1












Wald Chi-squared  1,031.38 4,924.04 1,119.83 2,041.80 3,469.52 9,042.59 9,040.39 6,572.76 
Prob > Chi-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of Failures  18,441  18,441  16,666  16,909  16,909  7,391  7,391  7,391 
Number of Observations  605,664 605,664 405,012 414,300 413,300 126,123  126,123 126,123   44 
Failure event is the release of a recommendation by the analyst team j better than the consensus on stocks i in 
quarter t.  Analysis time is on 36 quarters, over 1995-2003, where last quarter 1994 represents time 0. Cox 
regression (Breslow method for ties) results are stratified by failure order. 
 
λ{t/N(t), Z(MARKET RETURNt, S&P500 COMPONENTt dummy, NASDAQ-LISTEDt dummy, AMEX-LISTEDt dummy, 
OTHER EXCHANGESt dummy, UTILITYt dummy, TECHt dummy, LNASSETSt-1, MARKET-BOOK VALUE RATIOt-1, EPSt-
1, ASSETS T URNOVER R ATIOt-1, ROEt-1, DIVIDEND Y IELDt-1, LEVERAGE R ATIOt-1, PRICE  EXCEEDING  200-DAY 
MOVING AVERAGEt dummy, SEOt dummy, ANALYST TEAM SIZEt, AFFILIATION WITH INVESTMENT BANKt dummy, 
SWITCH OF INVESTMENT BANKt dummy, LN(MONEY INVESTED BY AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS)t-1, HOLDINGS BY 
ALL MUTUAL FUNDS t-1, ALL-STAR ANALYST t dummy)} 
 
All covariates are time-varying variables. MARKET RETURN is determined by using the CRSP value weighted 
NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq index. S&P500 COMPONENT is a dummy equal to one when the stock is included in the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 at the end of each quarter. UTILITY and TECH are dummies equal to one when 
companies operate, respectively, in the two-digit SIC industry of 49, and in the four-digit SIC codes specified in 
Loughran and Ritter (2004). Performance indicators refer to the prior quarter, t-1. LNASSETS is the natural 
logarithm of total assets in million of dollars.  MARKET-BOOK VALUE RATIO is defined as the sum of the market 
value of equity and the book values of long-term debt and preferred stock, divided by the book value of total 
assets.  ROE is equal to quarterly earnings divided by the book value of equity.  DIVIDEND YIELD is defined as 
quarterly dividends per share divided by the closing price at the end of the each quarter. ASSET TURNOVER 
RATIO is defined as the quarterly sales divided by total assets.  LEVERAGE RATIO is long-term debt divided by 
the book value of equity. SEO is a dummy variable equal to one when the company realizes a new equity 
offering in quarter t. ANALYST  TEAM  SIZE is the number of analysts in the team.  AFFILIATION WITH 
INVESTMENT BANK has value one when the analyst team is affiliated with the investment bank serving as 
member of the managing syndicate for the stock covered.  SWITCH OF INVESTMENT BANK is equal to one when 
the investment bank is no longer selected as a member of the managing syndicate for underwriting new 
securities.  AFFILIATION WITH MUTUAL FUNDS has value one when the analyst team is affiliated with the mutual 
funds holding in quarter t-1 the stock covered. HOLDINGS BY AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS are defined as the 
percent ratio between the shares held by the affiliated mutual funds at the end of the quarter t-1 divided by all 
shares outstanding.  WEIGHT IN AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS is the percentage of the dollar amount invested in 
stock j by the affiliated money manager divided by all 13f holdings in quarter t-1.  LN(MONEY INVESTED BY 
AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS)t-1 is the natural logarithm of the dollar amount invested, in million of dollars, by 
affiliated mutual funds in stock j.  Investment is determined as number of held shares multiplied by the stock 
price at the end of the quarter.  HOLDINGS BY ALL MUTUAL FUNDS are defined as the percent ratio between the 
shares held by all mutual funds at the end of quarter t-1 divided by all shares outstanding.  ALL-STAR ANALYST 
is a dummy equal to one when the analyst issuing the report belongs to the All-American Research Team as 
selected by Institutional Investor magazine every October.  Lin and Wei’s (1989) heteroscedasticity-adjusted z-
statistics are in parentheses.  
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Table X 
 
Probit for Probability that Analyst Teams Will Assign Favorable (Better-than-Consensus) Ratings 
by Subperiods 
 































































































































































































Wald Chi-squared  8,037.8  3,431.9 2,789.4 1,760.0 
Prob > Chi-squared  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximized pseudo log-likelihood  -24,241  -13,511 -6,334  -3,626 
Pseudo R
2 0.1369  0.1095 0.1802 0.1964 
Number of Observations  126,123  62,978 40,661 22,484 
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Table XI 
 
Random Effects GLS of Favorable (Better-than-Consensus) Ratings on  
the Change in Holdings by Affiliated Mutual Funds 
 
1 2   








FAVORABLE RATINGt-1 dummy [LAGGED]  -0.02 
(-1.20) 
-0.02 
(-1.31)  -- -- 





(0.08)  -- -- 




FAVORABLE RATING FROM ALL-STAR ANALYSTt 


















































































































Wald Chi-squared  179.40 173.80 137.81  139.75 
Prob > Chi-squared  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R
2 0.011 0.011 0.010  0.010 
Number of Observations  15,629 15,629 15,629  15,629 
 
Analysis time is on 36 quarters, from 1995 to 2003, with the last quarter 1994 representing time 0. The dependent 
variable is defined as the change in the number of shares held by an affiliated institutional investor between quarter t-
1 and t. Random effects GLS are panel regressions in which the error term is decomposed in a cross-section 
(illustrating either analyst team or firm-related heterogeneity) and a time series component. A constant intercept is 
estimated but not reported. Estimation is performed by maximum likelihood. White’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted z-
statistics are in parentheses.  
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All covariates are time-varying variables.  FAVORABLE RATING is a dummy that takes value one when the affiliated 
analyst issues a recommendation that is more favorable than the consensus.  FAVORABLE RATING FROM ALL-STAR 
ANALYST  is a dummy that takes value one when the analyst issuing a favorable (better-than-consensus) 
recommendation belongs to the All-American Research Team as selected by Institutional Investor magazine every 
October.  CHANGE IN HOLDINGS BY ALL MUTUAL FUNDS measures the change between quarter t-1 and t in total 
percentage of the firm’s equity held by institutional investors.  CHANGE IN STOCK PRICEt measures the change in the 
closing market price between quarter t-1 and t.  All performance indicators are measured as changes between quarter 
t-1 and quarter t.   Figure 1 
 











































































































































Number of Active Observations
Number of Observations with Quarterly Reports
Quarterly Issue Rate of Reports
 
 
Analysis is of 36 consecutive quarters over 1995-2003.  As of the end of 1994, the sample consisted of 16,824 
observations constructed as pairs of analyst team i and stock j (i = 1, 2, …, 154, j = 1, 2, …,  4,121).  Over time 
some pairs may be right-censored mainly due to concentration in the research industry and/or stock delisting.  
Active observations are those pairs of both active analyst teams and active stocks at the end of each quarter.  
Companies delisted after merger with other firms are not regarded as active.  The quarterly coverage rate is 
determined as the total number of observations with at least one report during the quarter divided by the number 
of active observations at the end of that quarter.  Data are from IBES and CRSP/Compustat Merged Database. 
  48 Figure 2 
 
Performance of Stocks Receiving Quarterly Coverage 
 














































Observations with Reports in Quarter t
Observations without Reports in Quarter t
 










































Observations with Reports in Quarter t
Observations without Reports in Quarter t
 



















































Observations with Reports in Quarter t
Observations without Reports in Quarter t
 



















































































Observations with Reports in Quarter t
Observations without Reports in Quarter t
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The figure accounts for the right-censoring in the initial 16,824 observations as pairs of analyst team i and stock 
j (i = 1, 2, …, 154, j = 1, 2, …,  4,121).  In each quarter t, stock j may receive coverage from the analyst team i, 
but no coverage from any other analyst teams.  The market-book value ratio is defined as the sum of the market 
value of equity and the book values of long-term debt and preferred stock, divided by the book value of total 
assets.  Asset turnover is defined as quarterly sales divided by total assets. Figure 3 
 
Distribution of Ratings 
by Analyst Team Affiliation and Subperiods 
 
















Panel B: Analyst Teams Unaffiliated with Investment Banks 





























1 = Strong Buy 2 = Buy 3 = Hold 4 = Underperform 5 = Sell
1995-1998 1999-2001 2002-2003
 













1 = Strong Buy 2 = Buy 3 = Hold 4 = Underperform 5 = Sell
1995-1998 1999-2001 2002-2003
 
  52 